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1. Introduction 
Both the marketing and economics literature study markets where three competitors are 
present - a market structure known as a triopoly in economics and a “Rule of Three” (RoT) in 
marketing. 
The marketing strand argues that the majority of manufacturing industries have a few large 
companies that lead the market followed by a fringe of firms (Axtell, 2001; Buzzell, 1981; Gans 
and Quiggin, 2003; Ijiri and Simon 1977; Quandt 1966). Sheth and Sisodia (2002) argue that 
an industry structure consisting of three large generalists and numerous smaller specialists 
generates a competitive environment that is “optimal” for firm stability and profitability. Uslay 
et.al. (2010) show that industries with three firms financially outperform every other market 
structure, both in terms of operating returns to assets and in terms of annual cumulative 
abnormal returns. The RoT theory also appears in a variety of practitioner-oriented publications 
like Sheth and Sisodia (1998), Gordon (2001), Landry (2002), Saffersfone (2002) and Henricks 
(2002).  
All these studies differ from our work in two main aspects. First, they study RoT market 
structures without dealing with the impact of exchange rates on profitability. They focus on the 
convergence to a RoT market structure, while we look at markets that already have converged 
to this market structure and study the impact of exchange rate on prices and profits (exposure) 
in an international Bertrand triopoly model. 
The economics literature also looks at markets with three competitors (Shugan ,1989; Puu 
and Marin, 2006; Bouis et al., 2009; Ji, 2009; Elabbasy, et al., 2009; Elsadany et al., 2013; 
Matouk et. al., 2017; Shibata, 2016; Andaluz and Jarne, 2015; Andaluz, et. al. 2017). All these 
studies differ from our work in two main aspects. First, they study a triopoly (or quadropoly) but 
in a closed economy, while we focus on an international triopoly modelling the competition 
between domestic and foreign firms, and the combined effects of the between and within 
competition. Second, the focus of our paper is not on stability, but on the impact of exchange 
rate on profits (exposure) in a price-setting model. This is important from a financial point of 
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view, as it explains the implications on the performance on markets as they evolve into RoT 
ones. To the best of our knowledge, no other study examines the impact of exchange rates on 
prices (passthrough) and profits (exposure) on a RoT market structure. We study two versions 
of the RoT model — a static and a dynamic one — to explore short-run and long-run exposure, 
which corresponds to consumable and durable goods respectively.  
For the latter model, we employ a switching cost model constructing a dynamic framework 
following the rich literature on switching costs with seminal articles, such as Beggs and 
Klemperer (1992), Cabral and Villas-Boas (2005) and, more recently, Rhodes (2014). We 
produce a theoretical framework that connects economics with strategic management, focusing 
on a price-setting model. 
As mentioned above, our paper is connected to the exchange-rate exposure literature. 
Bodnar et al.,(2002) develop and estimate a model for eight Japanese export industries during 
1986-1995. They examine if the relation between exchange-rate exposure and passthrough as 
derived in their model is consistent with actual market behavior. Flode´n et al. (2008) study how 
changes on the supply side across industries affects the relationship between passthrough and 
exposure. Since pricing affects profitability, they argue that nonlinearities in the cost function 
when studying the relationship between exchange-rate passthrough and exposure across 
industries are important. However, they study only the cases of monopolistic competition and a 
Bertrand and a Cournot duopoly, in which one of the two firms only operates in its domestic 
country and the other operates in both domestic and exports abroad, while we look at a RoT 
market structure. 
Bartram et al., (2008) expand the theoretical model of Bodnar, et al., to examine the 
exchange-rate exposures of a global firm that can compete and produce in both a foreign and 
local market. In the Bodnar, et al. model, the exporting firm cannot sell in its own market and 
the local firm cannot produce abroad. Bartram et al. derive optimal pass-through decisions and 
the resulting foreign exchange exposures of global firms in globally competitive industries. The 
Bartram et al. model shows exposure to be a function of market share, product substitutability, 
4 
 
and passthrough in foreign currency. Moreover, the exposure of the Bartram et al. model is 
smaller than the exposure in the Bodnar, et al., model under most conditions. Interestingly, 
there are cases where the Bartram et al. model produces negative exchange-rate exposure.  
Bodnar et al. do not study the impact of industry structure on exposure. Marston (2011) 
emphasizes the importance of the competitive structure of the industry in which a firm operates, 
on its economic exposure. However, he studies only the following cases: monopoly; a Cournot 
duopoly in which one of the two firms only operates in its domestic country and the other 
operates in both domestic and exports abroad; and the case of Stackelberg leadership by the 
exporting or the local firm. By contrast, we look at a RoT market structure. 
The dynamic part of our RoT model also relates to the Froot and Klemperer (FK) (1989) 
and Gross and Schmitt (2000) (GS), (2000) switching cost models. FK are the first who 
construct an oligopoly model with dynamic demand-side effects by allowing the future demands 
of firms to depend on current market shares. Their model is a two-period dynamic game in 
which expected exchange rates affect the value of current market shares. However, their model 
only includes two producers — one foreign, one domestic — and the goods offered are 
homogenous.  
GS use FK’s switching cost model. They maximize the value of the firm, namely the present 
value of its profits, showing that an intertemporal link exists in pricing decisions in a durable 
goods two period model. The dynamic formulation allows the study of the exchange-rate 
passthrough both in the long run and in the short run; the result is that price interdependence 
matters and that exchange-rate fluctuations have significant feedback effects on prices, 
resulting in lowering passthrough in the long run rather than in the short run.  
Both GS and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2011) note that there is an intertemporal trade-off as 
far as switching costs are concerned. Both Rhodes and Cabral (2017) study how old customers 
lock into the products of a firm. Consequently, they are less sensitive to price changes by that 
firm and its competitors. On the other hand, new customers will be offered lower prices as a 
“firm’s incentive to lock people in will outweigh the customer’s incentive to avoid being locked 
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in” (Rhodes, p. 172). How the firm responds to an exchange-rate change will depend on how it 
values its future profits as measured by the size of the firm’s discount factor.  
We note that our analysis differs from the GS paper, as they study two foreign producers of 
a homogenous good serving a market with no home production under Bertrand competition, 
looking only at exchange-rate passthrough and not foreign exchange exposure. Our model 
looks at foreign exchange exposure in a RoT setting where there are two home firms and one 
foreign firm competing in a Bertrand differentiated goods framework. We study how the 
intertemporal effects of exchange rates on the optimal prices of a firm’s domestic and 
international rivals will, in turn, change the magnitude of long-run as compared to short-run 
exposure.  
2. General Framework 
We start with a simple static model, as it is appropriate to study the impact of the exchange 
rate on consumable goods where the effect is a single-period one. 
We study the impact of the exchange rate, S, on prices and profits in the Bertrand model in 
a setting of differentiated goods and linear demands. We first look at a simple model with one 
home, h, and one foreign firm, f, setting prices 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃𝑓 respectively. The demand functions in 
the home and foreign markets are respectively 𝑞ℎ(𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆) = 𝜃𝜊 + 𝜃ℎ𝑃ℎ + 𝜃𝑓𝑆𝑃𝑓  and 
𝑞𝑓(𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆) = 𝜆𝜊 + 𝜆𝑓𝑃𝑓 + 𝜆ℎ
1
𝑆
𝑃ℎ, where 𝜃𝑓 , 𝜆ℎ > 0 ,  𝜃ℎ, 𝜆𝑓 < 0 , and constant marginal costs 
𝑐ℎ  and 𝑐𝑓  respectively, such that 0 < 𝑐ℎ <𝜃𝜊  and 0 < 𝑐𝑓 < 𝜆𝜊 , while the firms choose prices 
simultaneously. For the second order conditions (S.O.C.s) to be satisfied, 4𝜆𝑓𝜃ℎ − 𝜃𝑓𝜆ℎ > 0. An 
increase in S, namely a foreign exchange rate, appreciation increases (decreases) the optimal 
price of home (foreign) goods as 
𝜕𝑃ℎ
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
=
𝜃𝑓(𝜆𝜊−𝜆𝑓𝑐𝑓)
(4𝜆𝑓𝜃ℎ−𝜃𝑓𝜆ℎ)
> 0  and 
𝜕𝑃𝑓
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
=
𝜆ℎ(𝜃ℎ𝑐ℎ−𝜃𝜊)
(4𝜆𝑓𝜃ℎ−𝜃𝑓𝜆ℎ)𝑆2
< 0 . The 
positive (negative) derivative of the home (foreign) equilibrium price with respect to (wrt) S is 
the result of the fact that as this is a 1x1 case there is only between (countries) competition.  
6 
 
It is straightforward to show that an increase in S makes the h firm better (worse) off and 
the f firm worse (better) off if the equilibrium prices of their rivals are inelastic (elastic) in S. This 
is because 
𝜕Πℎ
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
= 𝜃𝑓(𝑚ℎ
∗ )𝑃ℎ
∗𝑃𝑓
∗[1 + 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗,𝑆], where 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗,𝑆 =
𝜕𝑃𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆
𝑆
𝑃𝑓
∗ <0, is the partial elasticity of the 
equilibrium foreign price wrt S and 𝑚ℎ
∗ =
(𝑃ℎ
∗−𝑐ℎ)
𝑃ℎ
∗  is the equilibrium price-cost-margin of h. Hence, 
the sign of 
𝜕Πℎ
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
 depends on 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗,𝑆; if the latter is elastic (inelastic) wrt S, the equilibrium profits 
of h decrease (increase) in S. Clearly, as S increases, unless f reduces its price so that it more 
than offsets the increase in S to restore its competitiveness, h will enjoy an increase in its 
optimal profits. The size of the change in the equilibrium profits of h depends on the cross-price 
substitution parameter, 𝜃𝑓, the price sensitivity of its rival to S, and its own price-cost margin.  
Similarly, 
𝜕Π𝑓
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
=
1
𝑆2
𝜆ℎ(𝑚𝑓
∗)𝑃ℎ
∗𝑃𝑓
∗[𝜀𝑃ℎ
∗,𝑆 − 1], where 𝜀𝑃ℎ
∗,𝑆 =
𝜕𝑃ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
𝑆
𝑃ℎ
∗>0 is the partial elasticity of 
the equilibrium home price wrt S and 𝑚𝑓
∗ =
𝑃𝑓
∗−𝑐𝑓
𝑃𝑓
∗  is the equilibrium price-cost margin of f. Again, 
the sign of 
𝜕Π𝑓
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
 depends on 𝜀𝑃ℎ
∗,𝑆. If the equilibrium price of h is elastic (inelastic) wrt S, the 
profits of f increase (decrease) in S. Hence, the profits of f, whose currency appreciates, will 
decrease unless h more than counteracts its gain in competitiveness through a more than 
offsetting increase in its equilibrium price. So, the change in the equilibrium profits of f will 
depend on its price-cost margin and the degree of substitutability between the two goods, 𝜆ℎ, 
𝜀𝑃ℎ
∗,𝑆 , and will inversely depend on the square of S. 
To conclude, in the 1x1 Bertrand model there is a link between the ability of each firm to 
pass on the exchange-rate change in the price it charges and the direction and degree of the 
impact on the profits of the other firm as a result of S.  
The above results cover the cases where one of the two firms is a monopoly in its home 
market and competes in the foreign market with the domestic firm there. Interestingly, 
exchange-rate fluctuations do not affect just exporting firms, but even firms which focus on their 
home country (Marston; Aggarwal and Harper; 2010).  
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3. A Rule of Three-Industry Structure 
Now we study the impact of foreign exchange rates on profits and prices in a RoT market 
structure, with differentiated products and linear demands, when firms compete in prices. 
 
3.1. Consumable Goods 
3.1.1. Between- and Within-home Countries Bertrand Competition 
There are three firms — we assume two home firms and one foreign. They offer 
differentiated consumable goods competing in a Bertrand model. Each h firm competes with 
the other h firm – within competition and with the f firm in the other country – between 
competition. The f firm faces only between competition. The two h firms and the f firm choose 
prices 𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃2,ℎ,  and 𝑃𝑓  respectively, and the three demand functions in matrix form are as 
follows: 
[
𝑞1,ℎ(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃2,ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆)
𝑞2,ℎ(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃2,ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆)
𝑞𝑓(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃2,ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆)
] = [
𝜃1,𝜊
𝜃2,𝜊
𝜆𝜊
] + [
𝜃11,ℎ 𝜃12,ℎ 𝜃1,𝑓𝑆
𝜃21,ℎ 𝜃22,ℎ 𝜃2,𝑓𝑆
𝜆1,ℎ
1
𝑆
𝜆2,ℎ
1
𝑆
𝜆𝑓
] [
𝑃1,ℎ
𝑃2,ℎ
𝑃𝑓
]                          (1) 
 The direct terms parameters are all negative, i.e. 𝜃11,ℎ, 𝜃22,ℎ, 𝜆𝑓 < 0 . The parameters 
pair, 𝜃12,ℎ, 𝜃21,ℎ  are the within countries cross-price effects, while the pairs 𝜃1,𝑓, 𝜃2,𝑓 and 
𝜆1,ℎ, 𝜆2,ℎ are the between countries cross-price effects involving the two h firms and the f firm. 
The firms produce substitutes, so all the cross-price effects are positive. We assume that each 
firm’s own price has a greater absolute effect on its demand than that of the prices of the firms 
it competes with, both domestically and abroad. Hence, |𝜃11,ℎ| > 𝜃12,ℎ , 𝜃1,𝑓 , |𝜃22,ℎ| > 𝜃21,ℎ , 𝜃2,f ,
|𝜆𝑓| > 𝜆1,ℎ, 𝜆2,ℎ.There are no fixed production costs, and marginal costs are constant, while 
 𝑐1ℎ < 𝜃1,𝜊, 𝑐2ℎ<𝜃2,𝜊, 𝑐𝑓 < 𝜆𝑜.  The optimization problems for the two h firms and the f firm are as 
follows: 
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Home Country: 
max
𝑝1,ℎ
Π1,ℎ(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃2,ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆) = max
𝑃1,ℎ
[𝜃1,𝜊 + 𝜃11,ℎ𝑃1,ℎ + 𝜃12,ℎ𝑃2,ℎ + 𝜃1,𝑓𝑆𝑃𝑓][𝑃1,ℎ − 𝑐1,ℎ] 
max
𝑝2,ℎ
Π2,ℎ(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃2,ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆) = max
𝑃2,ℎ
[𝜃2,𝜊 + 𝜃21,ℎ𝑃1,ℎ + 𝜃22,ℎ𝑃2,ℎ + 𝜃2,𝑓𝑆𝑃𝑓][𝑃2,ℎ − 𝑐2,ℎ] 
Foreign Country: 
max
𝑃1,𝑓
Π𝑓(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃2,ℎ, 𝑃𝑓; 𝑆) = max
𝑃1,𝑓
[𝜆𝜊 + 𝜆𝑓𝑃𝑓 + 𝜆1,ℎ
1
𝑆
𝑃1,ℎ + 𝜆2,ℎ
1
𝑆
𝑃2,ℎ] [𝑃𝑓 − 𝑐𝑓] 
Solving this gives the three equilibrium prices for the Bertrand model, which we use to study 
the effect of S on the three optimal prices. The vector 
𝜕𝑃∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
= [
𝜕𝑃1,ℎ
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
,
𝜕𝑃2,ℎ
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
,
𝜕𝑃𝑓
∗𝐵
𝜕𝑆
]
′
 gives the 
impact of a change in S on the prices of h and f firms. In the 1x1 Bertrand model, an increase 
in S decreases (increases) the price of the firm in the appreciating (depreciating) country.  
Proposition 1 
An increase in S has a positive impact on the optimal prices of the home goods and a 
negative impact on the optimal price of the foreign goods. 
Proof 
Please refer to the MA. 
 
In the 1x1 case, the existence of between competition only results in a positive (negative) 
derivative of the equilibrium price of the h (f) firm wrt S. The addition of a second home firm, 
which introduces within competition in the home market alone, does not affect the sign of the 
results. We next study 
𝜕Π1,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
,
𝜕Π2,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
, 
𝜕Π𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆
 by using the first order conditions (F.O.Cs) and replacing 
the outputs with the demand functions.  
Proposition 2 
Profit exposure is dependent on the exchange-rate price elasticities of two rivals, h and f in 
the case of each h firm, and wrt elasticities of the two h firms in the case of the f firm. 
 
Proof 
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For each h firm the impact of S on the profit of a firm depends on the sign (and if negative, 
on the size as well) of the elasticity of the f rival wrt S. It also depends on the sign and size of 
the elasticity of the price of the home rival wrt S: 
𝜕Π𝑖,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
= 𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗  𝑚𝑖,ℎ
∗ ⌊𝜃𝑖𝑗,ℎ𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗
𝜀𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆
𝑆
+ 𝜃𝑖,𝑓𝑃𝑓
∗ (1 + 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗,𝑆)⌋                               
for i=1,2, j=1,2, j ≠ 𝑖 , where 𝜀𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆 =
𝜕𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
𝑆
𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗ > 0, 𝜀𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆 =
𝜕𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
𝑆
𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ > 0, are the partial 
elasticities of each home firm’s optimal price wrt S. In the above relation 𝜀𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆 =
𝜕𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
𝑆
𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ > 0 is 
the within-market exchange-rate passthrough of firm i’s domestic competitor j and 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗,𝑆 =
𝜕𝑃𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆
𝑆
𝑃𝑓
∗ < 0 is the exchange-rate passthrough of the foreign competitor. Finally, the term 𝑚𝑖,ℎ
∗ =
(𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗ −𝑐𝑖,ℎ)
𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗  is the equilibrium price-cost margin of the home firm i.  
Hence, the impact of S on the profits of this firm depends on the firm’s own price elasticity 
of demand (as reflected through its inverse relation to the price-cost margin, 𝑚𝑖,ℎ
∗ ) and on both 
of its two rivals’ (home and foreign) price sensitivity to the exchange rate (i.e. passthrough). The 
addition of a home competitor increases the firm’s exchange-rate exposure relative to the 
international duopoly (1x1) case. In the case of an increase in S, it will affect the profits positively 
because of the home currency’s depreciation. We note that if 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗,𝑆  is in absolute value 
sufficiently larger than one, then the profits of the i h firm may decrease rather than increase 
because of an increase in S.  
The impact of S on the profit of the f firm depends on the elasticities of the two h firms:  
𝜕Π𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆
=
1
𝑆2
𝑃𝑓
∗ 𝑚𝑓
∗  ⌊𝜆𝑖,ℎ𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗ (𝜀𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆 − 1) + 𝜆𝑗,ℎ𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ (𝜀𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆 − 1)⌋ 
As noted above, 𝜀𝑃𝑖,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆 and 𝜀𝑃𝑗,ℎ
∗ ,𝑆 are both positive. Similarly, the term 𝑚𝑓
∗ =
(𝑃𝑓
∗−𝑐𝑓)
𝑃𝑓
∗  is the 
equilibrium price-cost margin of the f firm. Hence, the impact of S on profits depends on the f’s 
own price elasticity of demand (as reflected through its inverse relation to the price-cost 
margin 𝑚𝑓
∗ ) and on the overseas rival’s price sensitivity to the exchange rate (passthrough). 
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Consequently, as in the 1x1 case, the impact of S on the profits of the f firm may end up being 
either positive or negative depending on the size of the two h firms price elasticities wrt S. Given 
the ambiguity in the signs, it is impossible to determine whether the addition of a domestic 
competitor in one country increases or decreases exposure for the firm in the other country 
relative to the international duopoly case. 
3.2. Durable Goods 
3.2.1. Between- and Within-home Countries Bertrand Competition 
In this section, we set a dynamic model that describes the behavior of the three firms in a 
durable goods context. The firms choose prices 𝑃𝑡,1,ℎ, 𝑃𝑡,2,ℎ  and P𝑡,𝑓  in periods 𝑡 = 1,2 
respectively. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. The value 
of each firm 𝑉𝑡 at time t is the present value of its future profits Π𝑡+𝑖 at the one-period discount 
factor 𝛿1,ℎ, 𝛿2,ℎ , 𝛿𝑓  for each of the three firms respectively. The value functions for the h and f 
firms are the present values of their profits and their optimization problems in a simple two-
period game are as follows: 
Home Country: 
Firm 1 
max
{𝑝1,1,ℎ,𝑝2,1,ℎ}
V1,ℎ = max
{𝑝1,1,ℎ,𝑝2,1,ℎ}
[Π1,1,ℎ(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃12,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1)
+ 𝛿1,ℎΠ2,1,ℎ{(𝑃2,1,ℎ, 𝑃2,2,ℎ, 𝑃2,𝑓; 𝑆2), 𝑞1,1,ℎ(𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1)}] 
Firm 2 
max
{𝑝1,2,ℎ,𝑝2,2,ℎ}
V2,ℎ = max
{𝑝1,2,ℎ,𝑝2,2,ℎ}
[Π1,2,ℎ(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃12,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1)
+ 𝛿2,ℎΠ2,2,ℎ{(𝑃2,1,ℎ, 𝑃2,2,ℎ, 𝑃2,𝑓; 𝑆2), 𝑞1,2,ℎ(𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1)}] 
Foreign Country: 
max
{𝑝1,𝑓,𝑝2,𝑓}
V𝑓 = max
{𝑝1,1,ℎ,𝑝2,1,ℎ}
[Π1,𝑓(𝑃1,ℎ, 𝑃12,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1)
+ 𝛿𝑓Π2,𝑓
∗ {(𝑃2,ℎ, 𝑃2,𝑓; 𝑆2), 𝑞1,𝑓(𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1)}] 
11 
 
where 𝑞1,1,ℎ, 𝑞1,2,ℎ and 𝑞1,𝑓 are the outputs of the two h firms and the f firm respectively in 
the first period, and 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 the corresponding exchange rates in the first and second periods 
respectively. 
We use backward induction starting from period 𝑡 = 2. As there are switching costs, a higher 
consumer base in the first period would imply that consumers will be “locked-in” and buy from 
the same firm in the second period. Hence, we first maximize the profits of each firm in the 
second period, bearing in mind that the prices set in the first period determine the position of 
the demand in the second period. This means that all the second-period demand intercepts 
𝜃2,1,𝜊,𝜃2,2,𝜊 and 𝜆2,𝜊 are no longer exogenously determined and fixed, but are instead a function 
of the prices as set by the firms in the first period, i.e. for firm 1, 𝜃2,1,𝜊(𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1), where 
𝜕𝜃2,1,𝜊
𝜕𝑃1,1,ℎ
< 0,
𝜕𝜃2,1,𝜊
𝜕𝑃1,2,ℎ
> 0,
𝜕𝜃2,1,𝜊
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
> 0. Similar results hold for the other two intercepts with a negative 
own-price impact and positive cross-price impact. This follows the approach of GS, where 
“prices set in the first period determine the position of the demand in the second period” (p.92).  
We argue that this shift will only affect the intercept terms. This is a realistic assumption, as 
unless the relative prices of the goods change substantially between the two subsequent 
periods, we do not expect that the own- and cross-price effects parameters will change. The 
consumers will alter the degree that they substitute among different goods only when relative 
prices change substantially.1 Hence, without loss of generality, and in order to retain tractability 
in our results, we assume that the own- and cross-substitution parameters are fixed during 
these two periods. We first focus on period 𝑡 = 2, where each firm needs to find the prices in 
the second period that maximize the expression below: 
Home Country: 
Firm 1 
                                                     
1 An episode of deep price cuts by The Times in 1993 (from 45p to 30p), severely affected the market share of Daily 
Express ( typically classified as belonging in the mid-market range) rather than the upper range “quality” 
newspapers (The Times, Guardian, Telegraph and the Independent), thus altering the definition of the market 
(Behringer and Filistrucchi 2015). 
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max
𝑝2,1,ℎ
Π2,1,ℎ(𝑃2,1,ℎ, 𝑃2,2,ℎ, 𝑃2,𝑓; 𝑆2)
= max
𝑃1,ℎ
[𝜃2,1,𝜊(𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1) + 𝜃11,ℎ𝑃2,1,ℎ + 𝜃12,ℎ𝑃2,2,ℎ + 𝜃1,𝑓𝑆2𝑃2,𝑓][𝑃2,1,ℎ
− 𝑐2,1,ℎ] 
Firm 2 
max
𝑝2,2,ℎ
Π2,2,ℎ(𝑃2,1,ℎ, 𝑃2,2,ℎ, 𝑃2,𝑓; 𝑆2)
= max
𝑃2,ℎ
[𝜃2,2,𝜊(𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1) + 𝜃21,ℎ𝑃2,1,ℎ + 𝜃22,ℎ𝑃2,2,ℎ + 𝜃2,𝑓𝑆2𝑃2,𝑓][𝑃2,2,ℎ
− 𝑐2,2,ℎ] 
Foreign Country: 
max
𝑃2,𝑓
Π2,𝑓(𝑃2,1,ℎ, 𝑃2,2,ℎ, 𝑃2,𝑓; 𝑆2)
= max
𝑃1,𝑓
[𝜆2,𝜊(𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆1) + 𝜆𝑓𝑃2,𝑓 + 𝜆1,ℎ
1
𝑆2
𝑃2,1,ℎ + 𝜆2,ℎ
1
𝑆2
𝑃2,2,ℎ] [𝑃2,𝑓
− 𝑐2,𝑓] 
We set:  [
𝜕Π2,1,ℎ
𝜕𝑃2,1,ℎ
,
𝜕Π2,2,ℎ
𝜕𝑃2,2,ℎ
,
𝜕Π2,𝑓
𝜕𝑃2,𝑓
,]
′
= [0, 0, 0]
′
, to obtain the optimal prices that satisfy 
the F.O.Cs for the second period. We derive prices 𝑃21,ℎ
𝑀 , 𝑃22,ℎ
𝑀 , 𝑃2,𝑓
𝑀 , i.e. “intermediate” optimal 
prices of the second period that are functions of prices in the first period.  
Hence, the optimal prices M in the second period are functions of the prices and exchange 
rates in the first period through the impact of the latter on the second-period demand intercept 
parameters. We correspondingly define:  
π2,1,ℎ
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆2),π2,2,ℎ
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆2),π2,𝑓
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ, 𝑃1,2,ℎ, 𝑃1,𝑓; 𝑆2) 
 
as the intermediate profits for the second period, once the intermediate optimal prices for 
the second period have been inserted, thus making these profits only functions of the prices in 
the first period.  
Consequently, to find the equilibrium prices in the first period we now feed the above 
relations into the value functions and write them as functions of the prices and exchange rates 
in period 1. The F.O.Cs for the two home and the foreign firm are: 
∂V1,ℎ
𝜕𝑃1,1,ℎ
=
𝜕[Π1,1,ℎ(𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆1)]
𝜕𝑃1,1,ℎ
+ 𝛿1,ℎ
∂[π2,1,ℎ
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆2)]
𝜕𝑃1,1,ℎ
= 0       (2) 
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∂V2,ℎ
𝜕𝑃1,2,ℎ
=
∂[Π1,2,ℎ(𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆1)]
𝜕𝑃1,2,ℎ
+ 𝛿2,ℎ
∂[π2,1,ℎ
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆2)]
𝜕𝑃1,2,ℎ
= 0                    (3) 
∂V𝑓
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
=
∂[Π1,𝑓(𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆1)]
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
+ 𝛿𝑓
∂[π2,𝑓
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆2)]
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
= 0    
   (4) 
The dynamic optimal prices for the three firms, 𝑃1,1,ℎ
∗𝐷 , 𝑃1,2,ℎ
∗𝐷 , 𝑃1,𝑓
∗𝐷 , are derived from solving the 
above equations. They will only depend on the exogenous variables of the model, i.e. the 
exchange rate as well as the cost of each firm.  
In the case of durable goods, the specification retains the features that we encounter in the 
GS model. All other things being equal, a higher output today resulting from a lower price 
charged for the good translates to a higher demand for the same good tomorrow and thus a 
higher profit. In other words, the presence of a dynamic effect implies that pricing decisions 
today will have an impact on prices (and consequently profits) tomorrow by securing a larger 
customer base in subsequent periods.  
Similarly, an increase in the price of a good in period 1 will decrease the demand for 
that same good, not only in the first period, but also in the second period. In other words, 
since  
𝜕𝑃21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1,1,ℎ
,
𝜕𝑃22,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1,2,ℎ
,
𝜕𝑃2,𝑓
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
 are negative, this means that 
∂(π2,1,ℎ
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆2))
𝜕𝑃1,1,ℎ
,
∂(π2,2,ℎ
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆2))
𝜕𝑃1,2,ℎ
,
∂(π2,𝑓
𝑀 (𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆2))
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
 are negative too.  
Consequently, the L.H.S. in Eqs. (2), (3) and (4) will become equal to zero at a point 
where the corresponding first-period derivatives,
𝜕(𝛱1,1,ℎ(𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆1))
𝜕𝑃1,1,ℎ
, 
𝜕(𝛱1,2,ℎ(𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆1))
𝜕𝑃1,2,ℎ
, 
𝜕(𝛱1,𝑓(𝑃1,1,ℎ,𝑃1,2,ℎ,𝑃1,𝑓;𝑆1))
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
,  will be positive (instead of zero as in the static 
one-period model). This means that the optimal prices in the first period are less than they 
would have been in the static model, i.e. the intertemporal effect tends to lower optimal prices.  
We note that the impact of the first-period price on the demand function of its rivals 
implies a dynamic interdependence among the three firms, where all the terms  
𝜕𝑃2𝑖,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑗,ℎ
,
𝜕𝑃2𝑖,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1,𝑓
,
𝜕𝑃2,𝑓
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
  
are positive for 𝑖 = 1,2 and i≠ 𝑗. We examine this interdependence in Proposition 3 below. 
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Proposition 3 
The direction of the exchange-rate exposure in the first period on the value function of each 
firm from the currency depreciating country i: 
𝜕𝑉𝑖.ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆1
= 𝑚1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷 𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷 [𝜃𝑖𝑗,ℎ𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜀
𝑃1𝑖,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
+ 𝜃1,𝑓𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷(1 + 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗𝐷,𝑆1
)] + 𝛿𝑖,ℎ (
𝜕π2𝑖,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
𝜕π2𝑖,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
), 
depends on three factors.  
a) The first-period profit exposure:
𝜕Π1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
= 𝑚1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷 𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷 [𝜃𝑖𝑗,ℎ𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜀
𝑃1𝑗,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
+ 𝜃1,𝑓𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷(1 +
𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗𝐷,𝑆1
)]. 
b) The positive impact on the second-period profit function of firm i via the intertemporal 
effect of 𝑆1 on the first-period price of the h rival firm j: 
𝜕π2𝑖,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑗,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
, reinforcing the gains 
from a depreciation in the home currency for firm i.  
c) The negative impact on the second-period profit function of firm i via the intertemporal 
effect of 𝑆1 on the first-period price of the firm from the currency appreciating country: 
𝜕π2𝑖,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
. As the impact of an increase in  𝑆1  on the optimal price chosen by f is 
negative, its optimal price in the first period decreases. This leads to a negative impact 
on the profits of the h firm, thus offsetting the gains from the depreciation in the home 
currency for firm i. 
We draw two conclusions from the above result. First, we note that in the international 
duopoly (1x1) case the intertemporal effect of term (b) would not exist. This means that the 
difference in the exposure between the RoT model and the (1x1) model is larger in the long run 
than in the short run. Second, in the RoT case, the existence of two intertemporal effects with 
opposing signs means that we do not know whether the firm’s long-run exposure is larger or 
smaller relative to its short-run exposure. This contrasts with the 1x1 case exposure, where the 
long-run exposure is unambiguously smaller than the short-run given the absence of an 
intertemporal effect from a domestic competitor.  
The direction of the exchange-rate exposure in the first period on the value of firm f (the firm 
from the currency appreciating country): 
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𝜕𝑉𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆1
=
1
(𝑆1)
2 𝑚1𝑓
∗𝐷𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷[𝜆1,ℎ𝑃11,,ℎ
∗𝐷 (
𝜀
𝑃11,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
− 1) + 𝜆2,ℎ𝑃12,,ℎ
∗𝐷 (
𝜀
𝑃12,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
− 1)] + 𝛿𝑓(
∂(π2,𝑓
𝑀 )
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
∂(π2,𝑓
𝑀 )
𝜕𝑃1𝑗,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑗,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
),  
 
 depends on two factors.  
a) The first-period profit exposure:
𝜕Π𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
=
1
(𝑆1)2
𝑚1𝑓
∗𝐷𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 {𝜆1,ℎ𝑃11,,ℎ
∗𝐷 (
𝜀
𝑃11,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
− 1) +
𝜆2,ℎ𝑃12,,ℎ
∗𝐷 (
𝜀
𝑃12,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
− 1)}.          
b) The sum of the positive impacts on the second-period profit function of the foreign firm 
via the intertemporal effects of 𝑆1 on the first-period price of the two home rivals (firms 
from the currency depreciating country) i and j: 
∂π2,𝑓
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+  
∂π2,𝑓
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑗,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑗,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
 , thus 
ameliorating the losses experienced by firm f as a result of the depreciation in the 
currency of country h.  
The above result implies that the exchange-rate exposure for the f firm in the long run will 
be smaller than in the short run. In other words, the stock price for the firm is less sensitive to 
exchange rates than the profits. 
 
Proof 
Please refer to the MA. 
We note that the first term in the equation for each h firm includes the two terms found in 
the static relation in Proposition 2. The new terms in the second bracket are the positive (and 
correspondingly negative) impact on the value function of firm 1 via the intertemporal effect of 
𝑆1 on the optimal first-period price of the h rival firm (and the optimal first-period price of the f 
firm) feeding into the second-period profit of h firm 1. In other words, the rival h firm 2 and the f 
firm affect the profit of h firm 1 both directly and indirectly via the dynamic term. Written 
differently: 
 
𝜕𝑉1.ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆1
=
𝜕Π1,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+ 𝛿1,ℎ (
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
). 
This equation reads as long-run exposure = short-run exposure + intertemporal effect of 𝑆1 
on the first-period price of the h rival firm + intertemporal effect of 𝑆1 on the first period of the f 
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rival firm. Similarly for h firm 2. The equation for the f firm reads analogously as long-run 
exposure = short-run exposure + sum of intertemporal effects of 𝑆1 on the optimal first-period 
price of f firm’s two overseas rivals. 
We note that in the case of an international duopoly, which we have studied above, there is 
only a between dynamic interaction effect, which is negative, and the long-run exposure is lower 
than the short-run. In other words, the stock price is less sensitive than the profits to changes 
in 𝑆1.  
4. Conclusions 
This paper constructs a mathematical model of exchange-rate exposure of firms competing 
in an international RoT market structure. This framework extends previous approaches by 
allowing within and between countries competition. It constructs two versions of the RoT model, 
a static and a dynamic one, to explore consumable and durable goods producing firms 
respectively. The coexistence of between and within competition enhances our knowledge of 
competition interactions among firms in an international oligopoly. We establish a link between 
the ability of each firm to pass on the exchange-rate change in the price it charges its customers 
and the direction and degree of the impact on the profits of the other firms.  
 In particular, we find that in the static case the addition of a domestic competitor in one of 
the countries increases the firm’s exposure in that country, while the effect on its foreign 
competitor is ambiguous as it depends on the sizes of the exchange-rate elasticities of its two 
overseas competitors. In the dynamic case, we find that the gap in exposure between the RoT 
model and the (1x1) case is larger in the long run than in the short run for the company that 
now faces a domestic rival. On the other hand, the two intertemporal effects (domestic and 
foreign) have opposing signs. This means that the foreign-exchange exposure can be either 
smaller or larger in the long run relative to the short run. Finally, the firm that remains a 
monopolist in its domestic market finds that its exposure in the long run is smaller than in the 
short run.  
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Mathematical Appendix 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
We differentiate the optimal prices wrt S: 
𝜕𝑃1,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
=
𝜕|
𝜃1,𝜊−𝜃11,ℎ𝑐1,ℎ 𝜃12,ℎ 𝜃1,𝑓𝑆
𝜃2,𝜊−𝜃22,ℎ𝑐2,ℎ 2𝜃22,ℎ 𝜃2,𝑓𝑆
𝜆𝜊−𝜆𝑓𝑐𝑓 𝜆2,ℎ
1
𝑆
2𝜆𝑓
|
𝜕𝑆
= [(𝜆𝜊 − 𝜆𝑓𝑐𝑓)(𝜃12,ℎ𝜃2,𝑓 − 2𝜃22,ℎ𝜃1,𝑓] > 0, 
 and, 
∆
𝜕𝑃2,ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆
=
𝜕||
2𝜃11,ℎ       𝜃1,𝜊−𝜃11,ℎ𝑐1,ℎ      𝜃1,𝑓𝑆
𝜃21,ℎ        𝜃2,𝜊−𝜃22,ℎ𝑐2,ℎ         𝜃2,𝑓𝑆
𝜆1,ℎ
1
𝑆
       𝜆𝜊−𝜆𝑓𝑐𝑓                2𝜆𝑓     
           
||
𝜕𝑆
= − (𝜆𝜊 − 𝜆𝑓𝑐𝑓)(2𝜃11,ℎ𝜃2,𝑓 − 𝜃21,ℎ𝜃1,𝑓) > 0, 
where ∆= |
2𝜃11,ℎ 𝜃12,ℎ 𝜃1,𝑓𝑆
𝜃21,ℎ 2𝜃22,ℎ 𝜃2,𝑓𝑆
𝜆1,ℎ
1
𝑆
𝜆2,ℎ
1
𝑆
2𝜆𝑓
|.  
Hence, the optimal price for two home firms increases in S.  
∆
𝜕𝑃𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆
=
𝜕|
2𝜃11,ℎ 𝜃12,ℎ 𝜃1,𝜊−𝜃11,ℎ𝑐1,ℎ
𝜃21,ℎ 2𝜃22,ℎ 𝜃2,𝜊−𝜃22,ℎ𝑐2,ℎ
𝜆1,ℎ
1
𝑆
𝜆2,ℎ
1
𝑆
𝜆1,𝜊−𝜆𝑓𝑐𝑓
|
𝜕𝑆
=
−
1
𝑆2
(𝜃1,𝜊 − 𝜃11,ℎ𝑐1,ℎ)(𝜃21,ℎ𝜆2,ℎ −2𝜃22,ℎ𝜆1,ℎ)+
1
𝑆2
(𝜃2,𝜊 − 𝜃22,ℎ𝑐2,ℎ)(2𝜃11,ℎ𝜆2,ℎ −2𝜃12,ℎ𝜆1,ℎ)<0. 
Therefore, the optimal price for the foreign firm decreases in S. 
Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 
By solving Eqs. (2), (3), and (4), we deduce the optimal dynamic prices in the first period, i.e. 
𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 , 𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 ,  and 𝑃1,𝑓
∗𝐷. Replacing them into the V (value) functions of each company, we examine 
the impact of exchange rates in period 𝑆1 on the value functions: 
For firm 1:  
𝜕𝑉1.ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆1
=
𝜕([𝜃11,𝜊+𝜃11,ℎ𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃12,ℎ𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃1,𝑓𝑆1𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷][𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 −𝑐1,ℎ])
𝜕𝑆1
 +𝛿1,ℎ
𝜕π21,ℎ 
𝑀
𝜕𝑆1
= 
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{
𝜕([𝜃11,𝜊+𝜃11,ℎ𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃12,ℎ𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃1,𝑓𝑆1𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷][𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 −𝑐1,ℎ])
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝛿1,ℎ
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 }
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
{
𝜕([𝜃11,𝜊+𝜃11,ℎ𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃12,ℎ𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃1,𝑓𝑆1𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷][𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 −𝑐1,ℎ])
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 + 𝛿1,ℎ
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 }
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+ 
{
𝜕([𝜃11,𝜊+𝜃11,ℎ𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃12,ℎ𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 +𝜃1,𝑓𝑆1𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷][𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 −𝑐1,ℎ])
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 + 𝛿1,ℎ
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 }
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
 +𝜃1,𝑓𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷[𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 − 𝑐1,ℎ] 
Using the envelope theorem, the first term is equal to zero, and the above relation is reduced 
to the following: 
𝜕𝑉1.ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆1
= 
=
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
𝜃12,ℎ(𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 − 𝑐1,ℎ) + 𝜃1,𝑓𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷(1 +
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
𝑆1
𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷)(𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 − 𝑐1,ℎ)+𝛿1,ℎ
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+ 𝛿1,ℎ
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
 
        (+)             (?)                   (+)                (−)       
As 
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
> 0,
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
< 0,
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 > 0 (as 
𝜕𝜃2,1,𝜊
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 > 0) and 
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 > 0 (as 
𝜕𝜃2,1,𝜊
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 > 0), this means that 
the first term is positive, the second can be either negative or positive, depending on the price 
elasticity of the foreign firm wrt 𝑆1 and whether the latter is elastic (in which case the term 1 +
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
𝑆1
𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 is negative) or inelastic (in which case 1 +
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
𝑆1
𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 is positive), the third term is positive 
and the fourth negative. Hence, both the rival home firm and the foreign firm affect the profits 
of home firm 1, both directly and indirectly, via the dynamic term in opposite directions. We can 
re-write the above in terms of elasticities and price-cost margins: 
𝜕𝑉1.ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆1
= 𝑚11,ℎ
∗𝐷 𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 [𝜃12,ℎ𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜀𝑃12,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
+ 𝜃1,𝑓𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷(1 + 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗𝐷,𝑆1
)] + 𝛿1,ℎ (
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
), 
 where 𝑚11,ℎ
∗𝐷 =
𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 −𝑐1,ℎ
𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷  is the price-cost margin in the first period of firm 1.  
The first term in the above relation includes the two terms also found in the static relation 
in Proposition 2. The two additional terms in the second bracket are the positive (and 
correspondingly negative) impact on the value function of the first firm via the intertemporal 
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effect of 𝑆1 on the optimal first-period price of the home rival firm (and the optimal first-period 
price of the foreign firm) feeding into the second-period profit of home firm 1. In other words, 
the rival home firm and the foreign firm affect the profit of home firm 1, both directly and 
indirectly, via the dynamic term. Written differently, 
𝜕𝑉1.ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆1
=
𝜕Π1,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+ 𝛿1,ℎ (
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
) 
This equation reads as long-run exposure = short-run exposure + intertemporal effect of 𝑆1 on 
the first-period price of the home rival firm + intertemporal effect of 𝑆1 on the first period of the 
foreign rival firm. Similarly, for the second h firm,  
𝜕𝑉2.ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑆1
=  𝑚12,ℎ
∗𝐷 𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 [𝜃21,ℎ𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜀
𝑃11,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
+ 𝜃2,𝑓𝑃1,𝑓
∗𝐷(1 + 𝜀𝑃𝑓
∗𝐷,𝑆1
)] + 𝛿2,ℎ (
𝜕π22,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
𝜕π22,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
), 
where 𝑚12,ℎ
∗𝐷 =
𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 −𝑐2,ℎ
𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 , with 
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
> 0,
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
< 0,
𝜕π22,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 > 0 (as 
𝜕𝜃2,2,𝜊
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 > 0)  and  
𝜕π21,ℎ
𝑀
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 >
0 (as 
𝜕𝜃2,2,𝜊
𝜕𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷 > 0). 
Finally, for the f firm, 
 
𝜕𝑉𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆1
=
1
(𝑆1)2
𝑚1𝑓
∗𝐷𝑃1𝑓
∗𝐷[𝜆1,ℎ𝑃11,,ℎ
∗𝐷 (
𝜀
𝑃11,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
− 1) + 𝜆2,ℎ𝑃12,,ℎ
∗𝐷 (
𝜀
𝑃12,ℎ,𝑆1
∗𝐷
𝑆1
− 1)] + 𝛿𝑓(
∂(π2,𝑓
𝑀 )
𝜕𝑃1𝑖,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
∂(π2,𝑓
𝑀 )
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
), 
where, 𝑚1𝑓
∗𝐷 =
𝑃1.𝑓
∗𝐷−𝑐2,ℎ
𝑃1,𝑓
∗𝐷 , with 
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
> 0,
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
> 0,
𝜕π2,𝑓
𝑀
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷 > 0 (as 
𝜕𝜆2,𝜊
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 > 0)  and  
𝜕π2,𝑓
𝑀
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 >
0 (as 
𝜕𝜆2,𝜊
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷 > 0). 
Written differently, 
𝜕𝑉𝑓
∗
𝜕𝑆1
=
𝜕Π𝑓
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+𝛿𝑓(
∂(π2,𝑓
𝑀 )
𝜕𝑃11,,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃11,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
+
∂(π2,𝑓
𝑀 )
𝜕𝑃12,,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑃12,ℎ
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑆1
). 
This equation reads as long-run exposure = short-run exposure + sum of intertemporal effects 
of 𝑆1 on the optimal first-period price of f firm’s two overseas rivals. 
Q.E.D. 
 
